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The Criminal Psychopath
Readers who recall the Catholic Lawyer
Symposium on Mental Disease and Criminal Responsibility which appeared in the
Autumn 1958 and Winter 1959 issues will
be interested in a further treatment of the
subject in the December 1962 issue of the
Journal of CriminalLaw.
Writing on the subject "What To Do With
the Psychopath," James Graham points out
that it is no secret that the courts and legislatures have been reluctant to date to accord
the same prestige to psychiatry as to the
other sciences. The roots of the conflict run
wide and deep and to a great extent are
entwined with philosophical biases as to
questions of guilt and innocence. But no one
should deny that psychiatrists can aid the
legal process of shedding light on some ageold mysteries of human behavior; despite
widespread divergencies of opinion among
them in many areas of their study, psychiatrists have been able to define and diagnose
certain categories of mentally sick individuals. For example, the so-called criminal
psychopath presents a subject on which
psychiatrists, lawyers, and moralists may
find themselves in agreement more often
than not.
The majority of psychiatrists, according
to Mr. Graham, believe that the psycho-

pathic delinquent should be incarcerated
(after the commission of a crime) in a prison
or a mental institution or in an institution
which combines the features of both. In that
prison or similar institution, facilities should
be available for the application of various
forms of psychiatric treatment. Social workers and psychologists should be on the staff
to prepare case histories, interviews for
counseling purposes, etc. The length of
treatment, of course, may well depend on
the period of incarceration. A short sentence for a minor offence may frustrate successful treatment and return a potentially
dangerous criminal into society. On the
other hand, a heavy sentence could hang
like a dark cloud over rehabilitation efforts.
An indeterminate sentence is the answer
proposed by many specialists in the field.
Since 1937, twenty states and the District
of Columbia have enacted statutes to deal
with so-called "sexual psychopaths." The
term is strictly a legal one. It has no medical
justification, because medicine does not recognize a distinct line between sex offenders
and other law violators. The same varying
symptoms of basic difficulties are found in
thieves, burglars, etc. The statutes enacted
by the various states emphasize the need to
protect society from the sexual criminal;
they generally provide for special commitment proceedings, instead of broadening the
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tests of criminal insanity. Unlike ordinary
commitment laws, they usually require action by a District Attorney or AttorneyGeneral. The New York law is fairly typical.
It provides for a one-day-to-life sentence for
a defendant convicted of first-degree sodomy, first-degree rape, sexual abuse while
committing a felony, and for assault with
intent to commit sodomy, rape or carnal
abuse. The sentence may also be imposed
on one convicted of any felony if he has
previously been convicted, in any jurisdiction, of any of the sex crimes mentioned.
After conviction and before sentencing, a
psychiatric examination is made and its results submitted to the court to aid in determining what the sentence should be. The
law does not define sexual psychopath, nor
does it make any provision for treatment.
While Mr. Graham feels that the New
York law is a step in the right direction, he
is of the opinion that the "defective delinquent" statute of Maryland is preferable in
that it goes several steps further. This statute provides for certain proceedings after a
defendant has been convicted and sentenced
by a Maryland court for (a) a felony, (b)
a misdemeanor punishable by imprisonment
in a penitentiary, (c) a crime of violence,
(d) a sex crime of any of three types, (e)
or after two or more convictions punishable
by imprisonment under Maryland law. On
its own initiative, or by petition filed by the
State's Attorney, the Department of Correction, or by the defendant or his attorney,
which petition must state reasons why defective delinquency is suspected, the court may
order an examination of the defendant at
the Patuxent Institution. The Superintendent there, himself a psychiatrist, submits a
psychiatric report to the court, a "trial" is
held, and if the defendant is found "guilty"
of defective delinquency, the court suspends

the original sentence and sentences him
anew to an indeterminate sentence at Patuxent Institution.
Mr. Graham concludes by observing that
in the present state of our knowledge, the
Maryland statute offers an adequate solution to the problem of what to do with the
psychopath. It should mollify both the positivists in the field who stress rehabilitation
of the criminal rather than punishment, and
also the traditionalists who insist that a man
be punished for his crimes, provided he is
mentally responsible. Since science is uncertain as to the cause, cure, exact definition, and state of mental responsibility of
the psychopath, there is no alternative under
the law but to find him guilty and then detain
him in an institution where his condition
may be studied and treated.
The United States Supreme Court
Writing in the February 1963 issue of
the Loyola Law Times, Professor Robert
Burns presents an interesting analysis of the
present United States Supreme Court with
respect to its employment of moral imperatives. It is Professor Burns' contention that
for its zeal in rediscovering concepts of natural or moral law, the Court must be commended, but in the decisions of the Justices
embodying moral standards, the Court has
lost its focus on the conditioning elements of
time, place and circumstance.
In proof of his thesis, Professor Burns
examines the areas involving free speech,
religion, criminal justice and "state action"
in contravention of the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment, since
these are value-laden areas.
In the area of religion, he argues that the
Court has enacted an imperative of conscience which is unrealistic and utopian; in
the area of obscenity, an imperative which
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is completely divorced from the mainstream
of contemporary mores; in the area of search
and seizure, imperatives that are unknowable and impracticable; and in the area of
equal protection of the law, imperatives that
by nature are incapable of effective concretion by the rule of law. In each of these
jurisprudential areas, some members of the
United States Supreme Court have flatly refused to recognize, weigh, or balance such
"competing" values as social order, security,
civic peace and 'general welfare. In each
case the Court has been driven by a "moral
imperative" to decisions and rules which in
the real world cannot be made, like Kant's
imperatives of "a universal law," and which
have occasioned civic disunity, enforcement
difficulties and a truly deplorable disrepute
for the Court and its decisions.
After a thorough discussion of the cases
illustrating these findings, Professor Burns
concludes with the following blanket
criticism:
The United States Supreme Court deserves
praise for its commendable concern with
moral values, the rights of individuals and
the protection of minority groups from the
force and injustice of community prejudice.
Members of the present Court who follow
a theory of natural rights such as Justices
Black, Warren and Douglas are to be preferred for their instincts are different in kind
from the indifferent, unconcerned and irresolute. They are no rubber stamps for omnipotent government, pressure groups or
vested interests. I am therefore reluctant to
criticize but criticize one must for there are
alarming indications that perhaps a majority
of the United States Supreme Court have
embarked upon an approach to law and
morals which is imprudent and unwise. Like
the Duchess their hearts are in the right
place, but their laws, rules and standards
can function only in the make believe, not
the real world.
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Engel v. Vitale
Father S. Oley Cutler, S.J., whose article
on the moral and legal aspects of sex is featured in this issue of The Catholic Lawyer
makes some interesting observations on The
Prayer Case in the current issue of the
Syracuse Law Review. According to Father
Cutler, the Supreme Court must be the constant guardian of constitutional freedoms,
even against local school boards, but it is
another question whether the Court should
pre-empt the competency to adopt local experiments or endeavors to operate better
public schools. Here we go to the essence of
what is the factual problem in Engel v.
Vitale: what precisely is the purpose of this
type of school system. As Professor Corwin
notes, the matrix of the American public
school system was the Northwest Ordinance, enacted in 1787 by the last Continental Congress, operating under the old
Articles of Confederation. That great piece
of legislation provided for free public
schools for the first time with this avowed
purpose: "Religion, morality and knowledge
being necessary to good government and
the happiness of mankind, schools and the
means of education shall forever be encouraged."
Certainly, Jefferson, who is credited as
the father of the "wall of separation" phrase,
himself had very definite convictions of the
importance of religion in public education,
as his plans for his own University of Virginia clearly reveal. Yet, what is at stake in
the present case is not a question of sectarian indoctrination, as is obvious from the
nondenominational wording of the prayer
and the absence of any compulsion upon
pupils to recite it. Rather, the practice of
the prayer recital at the start of the day's
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classes represents the prudential judgment
of the Board of Regents and the local school
board. This judgment grew out of an effort
to strengthen the moral and spiritual training of New York State youth. In earlier
cases the Court has given wide and proper
recognition to individual freedom in the
field of education to parents and to school
boards. Parents were recognized to be the
fundamental possessors of the right to educate their own children as they thought best.
The Everson decision seemed to further
Pierce in that children who chose to attend
sectarian schools were not to be deprived of
the protection of state-provided school
transportation. McCollum represented a setback at this point, but it was minimized
somewhat by the holding in Zorach. It was
in the latter case that Mr. Justice Douglas felt
moved to say: "We are a religious people
whose institutions presuppose a Supreme
Being." With Justice Douglas' holding in
Engel, this sentiment seems to be slightly
withdrawn. Now that the Court has returned
to its old role as "national school board,"
one wonders what will happen next.
Father Cutler observes further that when
the heat of controversy has lessened, it is to
be hoped that the questions at issue will be
given a second look. Undoubtedly, "not by
prayer alone . . ." can the public school
achieve a degree of citizenship training
based on spiritual and moral convictions
such as the Board of Regents had hoped.
In a pluralistic society, where individuals of
many faiths and some of none, must live
side by side, working for the common good
of all, too much can be expected from mere
secular education to which the public school
system is necessarily committed. After the
Engel decision, the fear arises that one must
come to expect -too little.

Church-State
Dr. Sylvester Theisen poses the question,
"Can religion survive as a vital force in a
free pluralistic society?" in the first of a twopart article entitled "Religion and the Free
Society" in the March 1963 issue of Social
Order. With the thoroughness and objectivity of the scholar, he analyzes the extreme
complexity of the problem and concludes
that it must be settled outside the sphere of
government. In line with this thinking, he
sees the separation of church and state as a
means of assuring religious liberty.
According to Dr. Theisen, the effect of
the first amendment was to remove man's
search for and convictions about ultimate
values from the competence of the federal
government. This move was a bold and
original one. The American state left this
formation to a plurality of forces which it
placed beyond its control. Although American society was religious, the Constitution
provided that the national government
should not seek to direct that religious life
in any way. One must avoid the unwarranted leap to a position which demands
separating religion from all social institutions. The reason why no religion shall be
established is largely in order to allow exercise of religion. The Constitution does not
use the confusing figure of speech "wall of
separation" but uses instead clear, understandable words: "Congress shall make no
law respecting an establishment of religion,
or prohibiting the free exercise thereof."
This also forbids the establishment of secular humanism as the operative system of
ultimate values. The danger exists that because secular humanism is not called a religion, it can establish itself in violation of
the Constitution without anyone being fully
aware of what has transpired.
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The important truth gained from historical experience in this regard seems to be
"that democratic government can and does
operate successfully when some fundamental issues can be left unsettled. When
man finally decided that questions of religious faith could be left unsettled, democracy rose and fluorished .... The key to
democratic unity is not found in the agreement on fundamental principles. Rather it
is found on the willingness to leave outside
the sphere of government policy those issues on which men are unwilling to compromise." In regard to the cultural and
institutional developments of society, the
neutral state takes no position discriminating in favor of one or another set of ultimate values, so long as the basic democratic
civic values are not endangered.
Dr. Theisen argues that the discussion of
possible social policies should not be considered foreclosed by the Constitution. It is
evident, he states, that there are two aspects
of religious liberty: freedom from any form
of religious discrimination or coercion and
the opportunity for citizens to exercise their
religious liberty in positive ways. The tension between these two forms of religious
liberty is the source of the deepest problem
here and it is a mistake to try to solve the
problem by one-sided federal prohibitions
which take account only of the negative
form of religious liberty. Separation of
church and state must be seen as a means
for assuring religious liberty; otherwise, as
a dogma, it can easily be turned into an
instrument of oppression.
Federal Aid to Education
Father Drinan, S.J., writing in the current issue of Social Order, discusses the
theory advanced by Mr. Justice Black in the
Torcaso and Engel cases that the establish-
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ment clause can be violated without a violation of the free-exercise-of-religion clause.
Under this interpretation of the first amendment, questions Father Drinan, can it be
argued that the secularization of the public
school amounts to a violation of the establishment clause, since a particular form of
religion (or irreligion) is given a preferential
status? If such a violation of the establishment clause can be shown, Catholics or
others can enjoin it even though there is no
infringement of anyone's religious freedom.
Aside from the question of standing to
sue, can religious parents prove a violation
of the establishment clause if the state gives
financial assistance only to the school where
education is deliberately divorced from religion? Preferential treatment to irreligion
would seem to be as constitutionally objectionable as any preference given to religion.
Some Catholics have asserted that attendance at a public school by their children
violates or restricts the religious freedom
of both children and parents. The assertion
is made that Catholics have a right to be
treated like conscientious objectors or like
Jehovah's Witnesses who have been granted
an exemption from laws requiring a flag
salute in a public school.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter saw the force of
this analogy when, dissenting in West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, he
voted against granting an exemption from
the flag salute to children conscientiously
opposed to the practice. Mr. Justice Frankfurter saw the consequences of the Court's
bowing to the religious scruples of a minority and raised this question:
What of the claims of equality of treatment
of those parents who, because of religious
scruples, cannot send their children to public schools?
This potential argument of the Catholic
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or other parent has not been developed or
litigated. To be able to show that religious
parents "because of religious scruples cannot send their children to public schools"
(to use Mr. Justice Frankfurter's language)
would seem to require more proof of an
antireligious bias in the public school than
would appear to be now probable.
It is not now necessary, however, states
Father Drinan, to have such proof before
one can claim rights by reason of the first
amendment. Under the interpertation of the
establishment clause adopted in recent
years by the Supreme Court, any preferential treatment granted by the state to religion or irreligion constitutes a violation of
constitutional rights. The allegation that is
difficult to prove is, of course, the assertion
that the secularized public school gives preferential treatment to irreligion. The widespread and deeply-held conviction persists
that silence about religion in the public
school is the same as neutrality or impartiality. On this basic conception is built the
whole thesis that the public school can be
fair to believers and non-believers by assuming that their differences for the purposes of education are without significance.
It is this basic assumption of the public
school which, it is submitted, violates the
letter and the spirit of the establishment
clause.
The secularized public school meets and
treats its students only as future citizens.
Their religious or spiritual beliefs are to be
regarded as irrelevant and, hence, unimportant with respect to the entire educational
process. It is this basic disregard of the great
ideas and religious aspirations in the lives
of the students in a public school which is
the burden of the religionist's complaint. To
the believer - at least to many believers the silent assumption by the public school

that religion in any meaningful sense is irrelevant to the educational process amounts
to an official establishment of secular values.
Father Drinan concludes that it seems
clear that many converging forces have precipitated the national debate about the advisability of parochial schools sharing in
some part of federal aid to education if such
assistance is authorized by the Congress.
The debate is filled with anomalies, the most
curious of which is the fact that no controversy exists at the state level over parochial
schools, since at that level the question was
resolved in the last century when virtually
all states enacted laws prohibiting the distribution of public funds to sectarian schools.
In the federal-aid controversy, Catholic
spokesmen are in effect asserting that this
policy embraced in the last century by the
states is not a wise or fair one for the federal
government to follow.
Cogent arguments exist to support the
Catholic contention. Among them are the
following:
1) The fully-accredited private school
has important public dimensions in that it
carries out the secular goals of the state.
Because of this semipublic status conferred
on the private school, this institution has
some claim to share in the public funds set
aside by the state for the education of all of
its future citizens.
2) Public-welfare benefits surely include
secular education, and by the rulings in
Cochran and Everson the benefits extended
by the state to all citizens may not be denied
to anyone because of his religious faith or
lack of it.
3) In the distribution of these publicwelfare benefits no Supreme Court opinion
has held that the only constitutional formula
is one which prevents even some incidental
aid to religion. The Sunday-law decisions,
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in fact, expressly hold that the state is not
precluded from implementing its secular
goals in a way which bestows some collateral
benefits on religion.
4) In view of clear Supreme Court rulings precluding sectarian teaching and religious practices in public schools, it can be
persuasively argued that the granting of
funds only to the public school is a violation
of the establishment clause because such a
policy endorses and prefers one educational
and philosophical orthodoxy over all others.
This is the very essence of the Catholic case.
It seems fair to conclude that neither the
Congress nor the Supreme Court of the
United States has confronted the claim
which is being made by parents who are dissenters from the orthodoxy which the public
school represents. No quotation seems more
appropriate to express their sentiments and
to affirm the spirit with which the entire
controversy over church-related schools
should be discussed than the ringing words
of Mr. Justice Jackson in the Barnette decision:
If there is any fixed star in our constitutional
constellation, it is that no official, high or
petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox
in politics, nationalism, religion, or other
matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein.
Conscientious Objector
The Congress and the American people
have historically been deeply concerned
with protecting the free exercise of religion
and respecting the scruples of those who for
religious reasons claim they cannot conscientiously bear arms. Mirroring this attitude,
any legislation based upon this recognition
has almost exclusively limited relief to those
whose claim is based upon a duty to a higher
being, rather than a personal or political
philosophy. In attempting to obtain a work-
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able formula which will protect the religious
liberty of the sincere conscientious objector,
the major concern of Congress has been to
enact a law liberal enough to achieve this
objective, but strict enough to discourage
the coward and the shirker.
Father Francis Conklin, S.J., suggests,
however, in his article on conscientious objector legislation in the Winter 1963 issue of
the Georgetown Law Journal, that recent
United States Supreme Court decisions have
created grave doubts as to the constitutionality of the present exemption provisions.
Father Conklin feels that the Supreme Court
has removed the vital flexibility of the first
amendment and has placed obstructions in
the path of future congressional attempts to
devise a workable exemption provision.
According to Father Conklin, the sweeping language utilized in Torcaso v. Watkins
all but explicitly rules the "belief in a Supreme Being" clause of the 1948 Selective
Service Act unconstitutional. Moreover, it
casts considerable doubt upon the constitutionality of the ministerial exemption provision in that same statute.
In that case the Supreme Court held that
a provision in the Maryland Constitution
which required a declaration of belief in the
existence of God in order to qualify for the
office of notary public, invaded Torcaso's
freedom of belief and religion.
In effect, the Supreme Court has ruled
that any governmental attempt to define the
word "religion," as that word was used in
the first amendment, will be unconstitutional
if the definition excludes any philosophical,
sociological, political or humanitarian belief
which even the smallest minority chooses to
call a "religious" belief. As the brief for
appellant, Torcaso, clearly demonstrated, in
reaching its decision the Court had to repudiate the definitions of religion given in a
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whole series of previously decided cases.
However, the Court's opinion, as is usually
the case, contains no further indication of
the revolutionary interpretation it had determined to give the word "religion" in the
context of the first amendment.
The major portion of Father Conklin's
article involves a review of the historical
materials relevant to the word "religious" as
used in the "religious scruples" provisions
of the various state and military acts. He
then examines the ramifications of the Torcaso decision in the light of these materials
and discusses its effect upon them.
Father Conklin concludes that the difficulties which Congress must now face if it
wishes to continue the conscientious objector exemption can be seen by a glance at the
spectrum of conscientious objectors. At one
extreme would be the conscientious Quaker,
opposed to war in any form, and able to
point to the historical belief of his sect and
the sincerity of his co-religionists. At the
other extreme is the ordinary young male,
eager to see the world, but naturally hesitant
about killing or being killed.
In between these two extremes are: (1)
the denominationally-affiliated person who
expresses a minority viewpoint within his
denomination (such as the Catholic or
Methodist conscientious objector in World
War I1); (2) the conscientious objector
who believes that God has forbidden men
to kill each other-but is not affiliated with
any denomination; (3) the objector affiliated with a humanitarian organizationatheistic or agnostic-but in which the denominational opposition is based upon social or humanitarian principles; (4) the
independent, educated, articulate conscientious objector whose opposition may be
based on "philosophical" reasons (e.g., war
is a tool of capitalism), economic reasons

(e.g., war creates a false economy), political reasons (e.g., war is an inept and inefficient instrument of foreign policy), or-as
will usually be the case-for mixed reasons.
Then comes the final, and most difficult
category-the inarticulate conscientious objector.
Given this broad spectrum, Father Conklin asks where can Congress draw the line?
Up until now the line has been drawn at the
extremity of the theistic believers. However,
to move the line one notch and include the
denominationally-affiliated humanitariansas the American Civil Liberties Union advocated in 1940 and in 1948-clearly discriminates against those without denominational affiliation and "establishes" the denominations by giving them a sacrosanct,
status.
Moreover, any further attempt to classify
these objections to military service will be
frustrated by the simple expedient of having
a sufficiently articulate defendant designate
his political, sociological or economic beliefs as "religious," on the premise that they
occupy the same place in his life as the
theistic beliefs occupy in the lives of people
who believe in a Supreme Being.
Thus, according to Father Conklin, we
return once again to what seems to be the
basic problem which the extreme view of
the establishment clause propounded in
Torcaso raises: whether any branch of the
government can constitutionally define the
term "religious" in the first amendment
without violating that amendment. The historical evidence clearly shows that the
Founding Fathers and succeeding generations of Americans, although cautious in
their language, clearly understood the term
"religious" as being theistic in origin, concept and development. However, this historical understanding of the term has been
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brushed aside as irrevelant-and in the name
of greater liberty. We are thus returned to
the possibility that a frustrated Congress
will abolish the conscientious objector provision entirely.
Thus, the Court's espousal of what seems
to be a doctrinaire position has deprived the
law of its needed flexibility, and if rigidly
adhered to, will produce logically insoluble
conflicts. While the "Supreme Being Clause"
may seem objectionable to what Mr. Justice
Douglas called the "fastidious atheist," if
it does in fact constitute a government acknowledgment of the value of religions, the
fact remains that it is what the people
through the action of their Congress at the
time of the Constitution and ever since have
expressed as desirable.
Separation and Divorce
A set of rules of morality to be used as
guides for a Catholic attorney in a civil
action of either separation or divorce are
listed in the current issue of the Loyola Law
Review. Expounded by Father Louis Hiegel,
S.J., the rules permit the moral evaluation of
various legal steps in this intricate area of
domestic relations law.
In addition to the enumeration of the
aforementioned morality rules, the article
sets forth the tenets relating to marriage and
the family upon which the rules are based.
The most important of these are the following:
1) Marriage, once validly contracted, per
se endures until the death of one of the contractants. This is a matter of divine law. It is
therefore beyond the power of the state to
really dissolve the bond during the lifetime
of the parties. The Church, however, has
vicarious powers from Jesus Christ to effect
the cessation of the bond in cases of nonconsummation, the Pauline privilege and the
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Petrine privilege.
2) An annulment is a declaration by the
competent court that a marriage never really
ripened into a valid marriage; rather it was
essentially defective ab initio, and the defect
was never remedied up until the time of the
declaration of nullity. The competent court
to make such a declaration is the proper
ecclesiastical tribunal for all marriages in
which at least one party is baptized, the
proper civil tribunal for all marriages of two
unbaptized persons.
3) A valid, marriage between two baptized parties is necessarily sacramental and
as such is under the exclusive competence of
the Church. Also, the Church has exclusive
competence over the marriages in which one
party is baptized. Hence all questions pertaining to these marriages, as well as the
effects inseparably connected with them, can
properly be decided only by the competent
ecclesiastical court.
4) The State has competence over the
marriages of two unbaptized persons. Also it
has jurisdiction over the separable effects
(the merely civil effects) of all marriages
within its territory.
5) There are valid reasons which justify
married people to live separate and apart
without dissolution of the marriage bond.
For the unbaptized these reasons are evaluated according to the dictates of the natural
law. For the most part the various state
statutes giving grounds for separation and
divorce harmonize with the dictates of natural law, and for simplicity's sake will be referred to in this paper as statutory grounds.
For the baptized, the reasons for separation
are enumerated in canons 1128-1132 of the
Code of Canon Law.
6) Catholics are bound under pain of
nullity to celebrate their marriages before

